Abstract. UNESCO has given its Director General a mandate to draft a convention on protecting the diversity of cultural contents and artistic expressions by the fall of 2005. Proponents of the convention view commitments made by countries in trade agreements as weakening their ability to preserve and promote cultural diversity. We review the existing draft wording for a convention, developed before the official involvement of UNESCO, by the INCP, an association representing cultural ministries in favour of insulating their cultural policies from liberalization, and conclude that it fails to meet the necessary conditions for an enforceable rules-based international agreement. In the INCP text, countries are given rights to introduce policies that promote a self-defined cultural diversity. The only obligation is to balance their interests with those of others. No standard of adjudication for balance is offered nor any effective dispute resolution mechanism developed. The ultimate purpose of the initiative may be to form a negotiating bloc within the WTO, but the disparate interests of its members and the lack of tangible benefits from the Convention reduce the credibility of bargaining solidarity. In contrast, the WTO provides a flexible and effective forum for negotiating maintenance of current policy options at a cost of making concessions in other sectors.
Introduction
By consensus, the 32nd UNESCO General Conference in October 2003 gave the Director General a mandate to draft a convention on protecting the diversity of cultural contents and artistic expressions for presentation to the 33rd General Conference in the fall of 2005.
1 In contrast to a large number of non-binding UNESCO declaratory instruments addressing culture, the proposed convention is to be a standards-setting instrument, i.e., a legally enforceable set of rules rather than an awareness-raising document.
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For the countries sponsoring the UNESCO initiative, the October 2003 resolution was not a beginning but a stage in a process responding to the creation of the WTO in 1994. In the first stage of their strategy to minimize the WTO's impact on their policy options, the cultural ministries of these countries created two associations with international representation-the International Network of Cultural Policy (INCP) and the International Network for Cultural Diversity (INCD)-neither of which is directly related to UNESCO. Conferences of cultural professionals from French-speaking countries were also organized to discuss and promote a New International Instrument on Cultural Diversity, hereafter NICD, and at least in Canada's case, the advisory trade committee representing the cultural industries participated in the NICD process.
The debates, analyses, and draft texts produced by these organizations are our data set-words rather than numbers. Our hypothesis is that a rules-based enforceable instrument on cultural diversity is not possible. We "test" it by examining the most recently published draft (as of February 2004) of a cultural diversity instrument. We find no enforceable rules.
This conclusion raises the question of why considerable resources and time have been and are continuing to be spent on this initiative. One possibility explored is that the purpose was not to create an NICD but rather to influence the ongoing GATS negotiations in the WTO. We also examine the extent to which the WTO provides an integrated and flexible governance framework for the cultural industries. The structure of GATS and the nature of negotiations on services allow a country not to commit cultural services to national treatment or market access.
International agreements among sovereign powers, like contracts among individuals and organizations, are voluntarily entered agreements where each participant anticipates a gain. They differ from contracts in being self-enforcing. In this dimension, they are similar to illegal coordinating agreements like business cartels or turf-allotments among criminal gangs that have been explored in game theory. In another dimension, that of setting up elaborate internal mechanisms of adjudication and sanctions, international agreements differ from illegal pacts. A cartel, for example, is unlikely to keep elaborate records and establish fact-finding and assessing tribunals to deal with "cheating" because these processes raise the chances of being successfully prosecuted.
Enforcement of an international agreement ultimately depends on the ability to exclude members from the gains that it generates because of the absence of effective third-party adjudication. A member that is assessed a penalty will accept an assessed sanction rather than invite expulsion if the discounted value of future benefits is sufficiently high. The creative challenge in a rules-based international agreement is to craft rules that generate significant gains for each member and to establish a fair dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) and related "punishments" that deter non-compliance.
Concerns of the Proponents of the NICD
NICD proponents are concerned that WTO obligations may undermine their government's ability to pursue a wide set of policies-granting preferences to domestic suppliers, establishing foreign ownership restrictions, paying preferential subsidies, administering broadcast quotas, entering into bilateral co-production treaties, and supporting national broadcasting undertakings-affecting cultural industries and activities. Although the policies in question flourished under the GATT, the expanded and more integrative WTO is perceived to threaten their continuation. Proponents' reasons for maintaining a protective capability vary.
Language is among the non-opportunistic rationales. Small countries with unique languages and minority language groups within countries, such as French
